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ACCOUNTING & AUDITING 
auditing 
Weighing the Public Interest 
Is the Going Concern Opinion Still Relevant? 
By Jodi L. Bellovary, 
Don E. Giacomino, and 
Michael D. Akers 
In 1981, the AICPA addressed the issue of going concern status through SAS 34, The Auditor's Considerations When a Question Arises About an Entity's 
Continued Existence. In 1988, the AlCPA 
issued SAS 59, The Auditor 's 
Consideration of an Entity's Ability to 
Continue as a Going Concern, which 
remains the authoritative guidance. To 
determine if additional guidance on the 
topic of going concern is provided by 
accounting organizations, the authors con-
tacted the AICPA and the state CPA soci-
eties (50 of 51 responded, including 
Washington, D.C.). The authors found that 
none of these organizations provide addi-
tional literature or guidance in this area. 
Despite the preponderance of evidence 
suggesting that the going concern opinion 
lacks significant informative value, sever-
al individuals have called for additional 
guidance in the area of going concern. 
With each company failure shortly after the 
issuance of a non-going concern audit 
report, the public asks the question: "Where 
were the auditors?" Conversely, a survey 
of auditors found that the majority of 
respondents consider current standards suf-
ficient. Auditors believe that going concern 
assessment requires significant judgment 
and that each case must be reviewed on an 
individual basis. 
Authoritative Literature 
Prior to SAS 34, the authoritative liter-
ature provided little guidance on when the 
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auditor should consider modifying the 
audit opinion based on uncertainty that the 
entitiy could continue as a going con-
cern. SAS 34 was issued in response to 
the preponderance of cases where the audi-
tor's judgment was called into question 
after a business failure. SAS 34 in para-
graphs 7 and 8 required auditors to con-
sider contrary information and mitigating 
factors, and in paragraph 3 required man-
agement's plans when evidence of audit 
procedures suggested there may be a ques-
tion as to the company's ability to con-
tinue as a going concern. According to 
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paragraph 4, contrary information includ-
ed negative cash flow from operations, 
recurring operating losses, debt default, 
loss of key personnel, and litigation. 
Paragraph 5 presents mitigating factors that 
may offset the effects of contrary infor-
mation, including the ability to dispose 
of assets, the availability of sources for 
borrowing or capital, and the capability 
to reduce expenses or delay expenditures. 
Paragraph 9 required auditors to review 
management's response to the contrary 
information (plans for asset disposal, bor-
rowing, or delay of expenditures) to assess 
the effects and feasibility of the plans. 
Based on this evaluation, the auditor 
must judge the appropriateness of modi-
fying the audit opinion to indicate an 
uncertainty about the entity's going con-
cern status (paragraph 11). 
Problems continued after the issuance of 
SAS 34: "Questions [remained] about 
whether auditors had been taking sufficient 
responsibility for evaluating a client's abil-
ity to continue in existence" 
("Documenting Compliance with SAS 59," 
by Fred Goldstein, The CPA Journal, 
July 1989). Furthermore, companies were 
still failing after receiving an unqualified 
audit opinion. SAS 59 was one of the 
nine "expectation gap auditing standards" 
issued in 1988 to address the differences 
between public expectations and auditors' 
responsibilities. SAS 59 increases the audi-
tor's responsibility for going concern eval-
uation in an effort to improve external audi-
tor communications. Some, however, 
believe that SAS 59 adds little to the 
authoritative guidance. In "Going-Concern 
Audit Report Recipients Before and After 
SAS No. 59" [The National Public 
Accountant 43 (8): 24--25 (l998)], Marshall 
K. Geiger, Kannan Raghunandan, and 
Dasartha V. Rama state that going concern 
assessment was a part of practice before 
SAS 59, saying the statement "appears to 
have only codified existing practice." The 
authors attempted to gain more informa-
tion from the AICP A on the response to 
the issuance of SAS 59 through the orig-
inal comment letters; unfortunately, they 
are no longer available. 
There are three noteworthy changes 
from SAS 34 to SAS 59. [See "The 
Expectation Gap Auditing Standards," by 
Dan Guy and J. Sullivan, Journal of 
Accountancy 165 (4) 1988; "The 
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Auditor's Going-Concern Decision: A 
Review and Implications for Future 
Research," by S. Asare, Journal of 
Accounting Literature 9: 39-64, 1990; 
"How to Evaluate Going Concern," by J. 
Ellingsen, Kurt Pany, and P. Fagan, 
Journal of Accountancy 167 (1) 1989; 
"Understanding SAS No. 59: The 
Auditor's Going Concern 
Responsibilities," by S. Robison, The 
Practical Accountant 22 (9) 1989.] 
First, SAS 59 requires auditors to con-
sider going concern status for every audit 
engagement. SAS 34 required going con-
cern consideration only when audit pro-
cedures indicated that there may be a 
question as to the company's going con-
cern status. SAS 59, paragraph 5, does 
not require, however, that audit proce-
dures be designed specifically to address 
the going concern issue. Therefore, the 
change from SAS 34 to SAS 59 is not a 
requirement of additional audit proce-
dures, but rather a requirement of going 
concern consideration in every audit. 
Second, SAS 59 requires that the audit 
report be modified if there is substantial 
doubt about the entity's going concern 
status. SAS 34 required a qualified audit 
report if there was uncertainty regarding 
the recoverability of assets and the clas-
sification of liabilities. Third, SAS 59 
requires an explanatory paragraph in the 
audit report regarding the substantial 
doubt; SAS 34 merely required a quali-
fied "subject to" opinion. 
The Impact of SAS 34 and SAS 59 
Several studies have been conducted to 
determine how SAS 34 and SAS 59 
affect audit reports. As the authoritative 
guidance places more responsibility on 
auditors, one would expect auditors to issue 
more going concern-modified audit reports 
[see Joseph V. Carcello, Dana R. 
Hermanson, and H. Fenwick Huss, 
"Temporal Changes in Bankruptcy-Related 
Reporting," Auditing: A Journal of Practice 
and Theory 14 (2) 1995, and Raghunandan 
and Rama, "Audit Reports for Companies 
in Financial Distress: Before and After 
SAS No. 59," Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice and Theory, 14 (1) 1995]. The 
work of Raghunandan and Rama sup-
ports this expectation; they found that audi-
tors are more likely to issue going concern 
opinions post-SAS 59 than pre-SAS 59. 
Carcello et al. provide evidence that 
auditors were more likely to issue going 
concern-modified audit reports post-SAS 
34 than pre-SAS 34. Contrary to 
Raghunandan and Rama's results, howev-
er, Carcello et al. found the likelihood to 
modify audit reports is not significantly dif-
ferent when comparing pre-SAS 59 to 
post-SAS 59. Geiger et al. reported simi-
lar results, and found that the mean prob-
abilities of bankruptcy pre-SAS 59 and 
post-SAS 59 are not significantly differ-
ent. They go on to state that this "indi-
cat[es] that auditors [are] not issuing going-
concern modified opinions to differently 
stressed clients after the implementation of 
SAS No. 59." 
Other studies that investigated whether 
the going concern opinion adds value to 
the decision-making process have yield-
ed mixed results. Kevin C.W. Chen and 
Brian K. Church found that the market's 
reaction is less severe when a going 
concern opinion has been issued as 
opposed to when a non-going concern 
opinion has been given. They concluded 
Studies that 
investigated whether the 
going concern opinion 
adds value to the 
decision-making process 
have yielded mixed 
results. 
that the going concern opinion has 
informative value to explain excess 
returns around a bankruptcy filing. [See 
"Going Concern Opinions and the 
Market's Reaction to Bankruptcy 
Filings," The Accounting Review 71 (1) 
1996. See also Peter Dodd, Nicholas 
Dopuch, Robert Holthausen, and Richard 
Leftwich, "Qualified Audit Opinions and 
Stock Prices," Journal of Accounting and 
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Economics 6 (I) 1984; Dopuch, 
Holthausen, and Leftwich, "Predicting 
Audit Qualifications with Financial and 
Market Variables," The Accounting 
Review 62 (3) 1987; Michael Firth, 
"Qualified Audit Reports: Their Impact 
on Investment Decisions," The 
Accounting Review 53 (3) 1978; Lon 
Holder-Webb and Mike Wilkins, "The 
Incremental Information Content of 
SAS No. 59 Going-Concern Opinions," 
Journal of Accounting Research 38 (1) 
2000; and William Hopwood, James 
McKeown, and Jane Mutchler, "A Test 
of the Incremental Explanatory Power 
of Opinions Qualified for Consistency 
and Uncertainty," The Accounting Review 
64(1) 1989.] 
Betty C. Brown and Alan S. Levitan 
["An Investigation into the Effect of 
no valuable information to the decision-
making process. Clive S. Lennox ["The 
Accuracy and Incremental Information 
Content of Audit Reports in Predicting 
Bankruptcy," Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 26 (5-6) 1999] 
found that a change in going concern 
qualification has no significant impact 
and therefore concluded that the audit 
report modified for going concern does 
not provide valuable information. [See 
also Max Bessell, Asokan Anandarajan, 
and Ahson Umar, "Information Content, 
Audit Reports and Going-Concern: An 
Australian Study," Accounting and 
Finance, 43, 2003; R.R. Davis, "An 
Empirical Evaluation of Auditors' 
Subject-to Opinions," Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory, 2 (1) 
1982; R.Z. Elias and J. Johnston, "Is 
More than 40% of public 
companies that filed for bankruptcy between 
January 1, 2001, and June 30, 2002, received 
unqualified opinions on their most recent 
audit report. 
'Going Concern' Qualifications on the 
Stock Market," The Woman CPA, 48 (3) 
1986] reported that companies that receive 
going concern opinions show signifi-
cantly poorer market performance than 
companies that do not receive going 
concern opinions. Brown and Levitan, 
however, concluded that the auditor's 
opinion may not be the only factor affect-
ing performance, because the differences 
in performance begin three to five weeks 
prior to year-end. [See also C. Chow and 
S. Rice, "Qualified Audit Opinions and 
Share Prices-An Investigation," 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 
I (2) 1982.] 
The preponderance of evidence sug-
gests that the going concern opinion adds 
18 
There Incremental Information Content 
in the Going Concern Explanatory 
Paragraph?" Advances in Accounting, 18, 
2001; and 1. Elliott, '''SUbject to' Audit 
Opinions and Abnormal Security 
Returns-Outcomes and Ambiguities," 
Journal of Accounting Research, 20 (2, 
II) 1982.] 
Arguments for Additional Guidance 
Despite evidence suggesting that the 
going concern opinion does not have infor-
mative value, several individuals have crit-
icized the current literature and called for 
additional guidance in the area of going 
concern. Hian Chye Koh and Larry N. 
Killough ["The Use of Multiple 
Discriminant Analysis in the Assessment 
of the Going-Concern Status of an Audit 
Client," Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 17 (2) 1990] asserted that 
the problems with SAS 34 continue to 
appear with SAS 59 because the state-
ments contain essentially the same guid-
ance. This assertion would appear valid 
given that the same questions that arose 
after SAS 34 was released continue to be 
asked post-SAS 59: 
• Where are the auditors? 
• Why are businesses failing shortly after 
receiving an audit report that does not indi-
cate substantial doubt about the entity's 
ability to continue as a going concern? 
• Are auditors taking enough responsi-
bility for going concern assessment? 
Jonathan Weil ('''Going Concerns'-
Did Accountants Fail to Flag Problems 
at Dot-com Casualties?" Wall Street 
Journal, February 9, 2001) reported that 
during the wave of "dot-com" failures 
in 2000, only three of the 10 publicly held 
dot-com companies that filed for 
bankruptcy received going concern 
opinions on their most recent audit report. 
In some cases, the going concern opin-
ion comes too late. Weil referred to one 
case in which the company had a fiscal 
year ending in June. The company 
received a going concern opinion released 
in October, and went bankrupt in 
November. Another critic, Martin D. 
Weiss of Weiss Ratings, Inc., in "The 
Worsening Crisis of Confidence on 
Wall Street" (2002), stated that more than 
40% of public companies that filed for 
bankruptcy between January I, 2001, and 
June 30, 2002, received unqualified opin-
ions on their most recent audit report. 
Weiss called this a "breakdown with 
disastrous consequences" and recom-
mended creating a clearer definition of 
the auditor's responsibility. Weiss sub-
mitted his report to the U.S. Senate dur-
ing its debate of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOA), in support of the new legisla-
tion. The Senate used Weiss' report as 
part of the consideration for the controls 
put in place by SOA. If the situation is 
so "disastrous," why did Congress not 
factor the issue of going concern assess-
ment into the new legislation? 
Elizabeth Venuti, in "The Going-
Concern Assumption Revisited: 
Assessing a Company's Future Viability" 
(The CPA Journal, May 2004), reported 
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that, post-SAS 59, nearly 50% of 
bankrupt companies did not receive a 
qualified going concern opinion on their 
most recent audit report. She also points 
out that "twelve of the 20 largest 
bankruptcy filings in U.S. history took 
place in 2001 and 2002," and that none 
of the 12 received qualified going con-
cern opinions on their most recent audit 
report. Venuti believes the issue goes 
much deeper, stating "modifications to 
the concept statements and auditing stan-
dards appear to be necessary." She refers 
to the International Standards on Auditing 
(ISA), which provides in its glossary the 
following definition of the going concern 
assumption: 
Under the going concern assumption, an 
entity is ordinarily viewed as continuing 
in business for the foreseeable future with 
neither the intention nor the necessity of 
liquidation, ceasing trading, or seeking 
protection from creditors pursuant to laws 
or regulations. Accordingly, assets and 
liabilities are recorded on the basis that 
the entity will be able to realize its 
assets and discharge its liabilities in the 
normal course of business. 
Venuti questions whether companies 
such as WorldCom and Enron would have 
received a going concern opinion had SAS 
59 used "similar language." 
Practitioners' Views on the Need for 
Additional Guidance 
Given the published criticism of the cur-
rent authoritative guidance, the authors 
decided to obtain professionals' points of 
view regarding the authoritative guidance 
relating to going concern. The authors sur-
veyed the top 100 accounting firms (in 
2004, according to Accounting Today) 
regarding the firms' policies and proce-
dures for assessing the going concern sta-
tus of clients. Exhibit 1 presents the sur-
vey results. 
Of the 22 respondents that use a formal 
checklist to assess the going concern sta-
tus of clients , 15 use Practitioners 
Publishing Company's (PPC) Going 
Concern Checklist CX-19, a standardized 
questionnaire that outlines the guidance in 
SAS 59. Seven of the respondents had 
developed internal checklists. (One respon-
dent uses the PPC checklist as well as an 
internally generated checklist; one did not 
provide a copy of the checklist used.) Four 
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of the internally generated checklists close-
ly follow SAS 59, similar to the PPC 
checklist. 
Seven of the 26 respondents indicated 
a desire for additional professional guid-
ance. Two respondents communicated 
confusion as to whether the one-year 
timeframe used for going concern eval-
uation extends from the financial state-
ment date or from the audit report date, 
and wanted additional guidance on the 
timeframe to be considered. One respon-
dent wanted to see more practical con-
siderations and specific guidance. 
Another respondent expressed a desire for 
additional guidance on how to deal with 
clients on this issue. 
The majority of respondents (19 of 26), 
however, believed that current authorita-
tive guidance in this area is sufficient and 
did not want to see additional profession-
al guidance. The overwhelming response 
was that going concern is an area requir-
ing significant judgment. These respon-
dents believed that each case was unique, 
requiring individual consideration. Cassell 
Bryan-Low, in "Auditors Fail to Foresee 
Bankruptcies" (Wall Street Journal, July 
II, 2002), reported similar reactions from 
practice: "A KPMG spokesman . . . said .. . 
'the going-concern clause . .. requires a 
great deal of judgment and is not some-
thing to be taken lightly.'" The spokesman 
also pointed out that critics make "unfair 
conclusions based on a tiny percentage of 
the thousands of audits performed each 
year by the profession," thus raising the 
question, "Is there really a need for addi-
tional guidance, or are critics referring to 
isolated situations?" 
Is Litigation a Concern? 
In the case of a business failure, audi-
tors are exposed to the risk that financial 
statement users will sue them for not 
issuing a going concern opinion to warn 
users that the entity may not continue in 
existence for another year beyond the 
date of the audited financial statements. 
There is also the chance that a company 
will sue its auditor for issuing a going con-
cern opinion "in error" (i.e., when the client 
does not fail). To assess the risks of liti-
gation, the authors searched for data regard-
ing auditor litigation cases and outcomes. 
They began with searches of Internet 
search engines, journaVnewspaper databas-
es, and the SEC website for the topics of 
"going concern" and "auditor litigation." 
The authors also contacted the SEC direct-
ly via telephone to substantiate the find-
ings of the SEC website search, which 
returned no instances of auditor litigation 
for going concern issues. Per the conver-
sation with the SEC, auditor litigation for 
going concern issues is not a primary 
concern or focus for the SEC. 
The authors also searched the auditor lit-
igation database compiled by Zoe-Vonna 
Palrnrose ("Empirical Research in 
Auditor Litigation: Considerations and 
Data," Studies in Accounting Research #33, 
EXHIBIT 1 
Survey of Top 100 Accounting Firms 
Question Finns Responding (26 total) 
Yes No 
Does your firm currently use a formal checklist to 
assess the going concern status of your clients?* 22 4 
Do you believe that current authoritative guidance 
in this area is sufficient? 21 45 
Would you like to see additional professional 
guidance on how to evaluate going concern status? 7 19 
* One respondent that indicated the use of a checklist is optional is irfcluded among -Yes ' respondents. 
19 
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American Accounting Association, 1999), 
which includes 1,071 instances of auditor 
litigation involving the Big Eight fInns and 
audits from 1960 through 1995. A keyword 
search of "going concern" returned 41 
cases, 14 of which were fraud-related, 
where fraud was the primary focus of the 
case; the going concern issue played a sec-
ondary role. In fraud cases, the proce-
dures for evaluating going concern status 
are not useful and the opinion is not mean-
ingful. A review of the 27 cases that were 
not fraud-related showed that 10 had going 
concern as a primary issue, not just as 
part of a long list of other issues. In fIve 
of the 10 cases, the case was either dis-
missed or the auditor was not held liable. 
In three of the cases, the auditors settled 
for amounts up to $5 million. In the other 
two cases, the outcomes were unknown. In 
conclusion, less than one-half of 1 % of the 
1,071 cases involved successful litigation 
of auditors for going concern issues. 
An examination of articles regarding 
auditor litigation revealed few instances 
of litigation for going concern issues. 
CarceIlo and Palmrose, in "Auditor 
Litigation and Modified Reporting on 
Bankrupt Clients" [Journal of Accounting 
Research 32 (Supplement) 1994], found 
that out of 655 public companies that went 
bankrupt between 1972 and 1992 and were 
audited by "Big" fIrms, 83 received going 
concern opinions on their last financial 
statement before bankruptcy or litigation. 
Of the 83 companies that received going 
concern opinions, only fIve were the sub-
ject of auditor litigation. Carcello and 
Palmrose do not provide specifIcs or the 
outcomes of the cases. 
According to the SEC, the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
makes it "more difficult ... for private 
plaintiffs to assert civil claims against audi-
tors," allowing auditors to have even less con-
cern for the risk of litigation. In fact, in 
"Going-Concern Opinions in the 'New' 
Legal Environment" [Accounting Horizons, 
16(1) 2002], Geiger and Raghunandan found 
that auditors were more than twice as likely 
to issue a going concern opinion before the 
1995 reform act was passed as after. 
Exhibit 2 shows that 9.5% of companies in 
the sample received a going concern opin-
ion before the reform act was passed, while 
only 3.5% of companies received one after. 
Geiger and Raghunandan concluded that the 
reform act relieved auditors' concern for 
exposure to litigation and has led auditors 
to issue fewer going concern opinions. The 
results of this study, combined with the low 
number of cases of auditor litigation for going 
concern issues, has led the authors to believe 
that litigation in this area is not a serious 
threat to practitioners. 
Prediction Models 
Bankruptcy and going concern prediction 
have been researched for decades. An 
increased interest in prediction models began 
with the development of Beaver's univari-
ate model in 1966 and Altman's multivari-
ate discriminant analysis model in 1968. 
The authors found more than 50 models 
available for bankruptcy or going concern 
prediction. The models employ various 
methodologies, including multivariate dis-
criminant analysis, logit analysis; probit anal-
ysis, neural networks, and hybrid systems. 
The number of factors considered ranges 
from two to 32 item~. These prediction mod-
els could help auditors anticipate fInancial 
EXHIBIT 2 
I 
Results of Geiger and Raghunandan Study (2002) 
Number of companies in sample 
Percentage that received a going 
concern opinion 
20 
1992-1993 
(Before 
Reform Act) 
662 
9.5% 
1996-1997 
(Transition 
Period) 
574 
5.5% 
1999-2000 
(After 
Reform Act) 
635 
3.5% 
problems and going concern issues earlier. 
Many of these models have demonstrated 
predictive ability as high as 90% to 100% 
in classifying bankrupt (or going concern) 
and nonbankrupt (or non-going concern) 
companies. 
So why are these models not being 
used? One reason might be a basic lack 
of awareness of the models or of their 
predictive ability. Perhaps if the models 
received more exposure they would be 
more widely used. Another explanation 
could be resistance to change. The 
authors found that auditors do not desire 
additional guidance in the area of going 
concern, which implies that they are satis-
fIed with current standards. Furthermore, 
auditors believe that going concern 
assessment is an area requiring signifIcant 
subjective judgment. As such, they believe 
that the use of prediction models would 
remove professional judgment from the 
consideration of going concern. 
The apparent lack of use of the models 
could also be attributed to auditors' worries 
that a qualified going concern opinion can 
become a self-fulfIlling prophecy. Auditors 
may be reluctant to use a model that may 
indicate the need to issue a going concern 
opinion due to fear that such an opinion 
will preclude the client from obtaining 
fInancing required to tum around the com-
pany's fInancial situation. [See K. Menon 
and K. Schwartz, "The Auditor's Report 
for Companies Facing Bankruptcy," Journal 
of Commercial Bank Lending, 68 (5) 
1986.] In addition, companies are likely to 
pressure their auditor to not issue a going 
concern opinion, placing the auditor in the 
difficult position of trying to keep the client 
happy while protecting the public interest. 
Another reason could be that the mod-
els make heavy use of ratios and, accord-
ing to interviews conducted by Mutchler: 
"[A]uditors by and large [do] not like ratio 
analysis." The auditors that Mutchler inter-
viewed thought that their "insider" access 
to the company provided far more infor-
mation than ratio analysis could provide. 
Richard Morris, in "Forecasting 
Bankruptcy: How Useful Are Failure 
Prediction Models?" [Management 
Accounting, 76 (5) 1998], provided sev-
eral other reasons for prediction models' 
disuse despite their apparent predictive 
abilities. Morris stated that the widespread 
use of such models would cause their use-
JANUARY 2006/ THE CPA JOURNAL 
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fulness to quickly vanish because as more 
people use the models they would cease 
to provide an advantage. He also point-
ed out that most models are developed 
by considering data from a variety of 
industries, which can influence the results 
because not all industries behave in a 
similar manner; "normal" ratios can vary 
dramatically across industries. 
Furthermore, the data are drawn from a 
number of years, and average perfor-
mance can change over time. 
Although auditors could use a prediction 
model to justify the going concern opinion 
to the client or in court, the use of a 
model could make it more difficult to jus-
tify not issuing a going concern opinion. 
M. Jennings, D. Kneer, and P. Reekers, 
in "The Significance of Audit Decision 
Aids and Precase Jurists' Attitudes on 
Perceptions of Audit Firm Culpability 
and Liability" [Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 9 (2) 1993] suggest that practi-
tioners are reluctant to use decisions aids 
By issuing a going 
concern opinion, auditors 
are interjecting 
themselves into the 
decision-making 
process. 
(such as prediction models) because out-
side parties may view these tools as hav-
ing the same effect as standards and penal-
ize auditors for wavering from the guid-
ance provided by a model. Lowe et al. cor-
roborate this suggestion, stating that "if 
firms develop and use decision aids, then 
they may be constrained to adhere fully 
to the decision aids' recommendations, as 
these aids may serve as implied standards 
of performance in future litigation." As dis-
cussed above, there is not a high risk of 
JANUARY 2006 / THE CPA JOURNAL 
litigation against the practitioner for either 
the issuance or nonissuance of a going con-
cern opinion. 
In summary, with a low risk of litiga-
tion, and potential increased accountabili-
ty from the use of a nonrequired predic-
tion model, why would the auditor 
choose to do so? 
Cohen Commission Recommendations 
In 1978, the Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities (Cohen Commission) pro-
vided recommendations for improving and 
specifying the responsibilities of inde-
pendent auditors. One area in which 
changes were recommended was report-
ing on uncertainties, including going con-
cern uncertainties. The Cohen 
Commission recommended eliminating 
from the audit report the "subject to" qual-
ification relating to uncertainties. In 1988, 
the AICPA implemented this recommen-
dation by no longer requiring use of a 
"subject to" qualified opinion to indicate 
substantial doubt about the entity's 
going concern status. As mentioned 
above, SAS 59 now requires a modified 
audit report with an explanatory paragraph 
regarding the going concern status. 
The Cohen Commission further sug-
gested the following: 
If uncertainty about a company's abil-
ity to continue operations is adequate-
ly disclosed in its financial statements, 
the auditor should not be required to 
call attention to that uncertainty in his 
report .... If the auditor does not believe 
disclosure is sufficient to portray the 
company's financial position, he should 
modify his opinion because the finan-
cial statements do not present the 
company's financial position in con-
formity with generally accepted 
accounting principles. 
If this recommendation were imple-
mented, the audit report would address the 
going concern issue only if the situation 
is not disclosed adequately in the finan-
cial statements. If the financial statement 
disclosures were complete, there would 
be no change to the audit report with regard 
to going concern. 
Recommendations 
The authors believe that the Cohen 
Commission's recommendations should 
be revisited and the going concern opin-
ion should be eliminated. The auditor's 
job is to assess whether the financial 
statements are presented in accordance 
with GAAP, not to judge the financial 
condition of the company. Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) 
I, paragraph 33, states that one objec-
tive of financial reporting is to provide 
useful information for decision making. 
However, it goes on to state that "it is not 
a function of financial reporting to try to 
determine or influence the outcomes of 
those decisions. The role of financial 
reporting requires it to provide even-
handed, neutral, or unbiased information." 
By issuing a going concern opinion, audi-
tors are interjecting themselves into the 
decision-making process. If the financial 
statements are prepared in accordance 
with GAAP and provide useful informa-
tion, the reader should be able to assess 
the company's financial condition. 
The authors further believe that the 
going concern opinion does not provide 
useful information, and therefore does not 
meet the objective of SFAC I. Often, mar-
ket signals already indicate a possible 
impending failure, making the going con-
cern opinion a lagging indicator. This sit-
uation is even more enhanced by today's 
technology and the ability to acquire infor-
mation instantaneously via the Intemet. The 
authors also consider the timeframe for the 
consideration of going concem too short to 
be useful. Many companies may appear 
to be "failing" in the near term of one year, 
but bankruptcy may take much longer or 
the company may turn around and avoid 
bankruptcy. 
After weighing the above factors and the 
evidence that the going concern opinion 
lacks informative value, the authors ask: 
Why do auditors need to modify the audit 
report for going concern? Considering that 
litigation is not a serious threat, one can 
see that eliminating the going concern opin-
ion is the favorable option. 0 
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